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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XX"V SUMIER, 1956 NUMBER 2
TME INTERPRETATION OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS: A PLEA FOR BETTER
UNDERSTANDING
ROBERT S. PASLEY*
A GOVERNMENT contract is a complex document. The standard
supply contract form contains twenty separate clauses and fills six
closely printed pages.' The Armed Services Procurement Regulation'
lists twenty-two required clauses for fixed-price supply contracts,3 plus
another twenty or so to be used where appropriate.4 The text of these
various clauses fills some thirty-six large size pages in the regulation.
Some of these clauses in turn incorporate by reference large portions of
relevant regulations.5 In addition to these standard clauses, a contract
may include a set of technical specifications, running anywhere from two
to one hundred pages.
These are ordinary, run-of-the-mill contracts. Contracts devised to
meet special situations may be much more complex. A contract form for
"Alkylation Facilities Expansion," prepared by the Armed Services
Petroleum Purchasing Agency, comprises seven pages of general provi-
sions, sixteen pages of special provisions, and fourteen pages of specifica-
tions, constituting the basic "construction inducement contract," and
then incorporates a twenty-one page supply contract, which is an entirely
separate instrument, but still part of the same basic document. One
such contract entered into by that Agency includes a termination pay-
ment provision which requires five and one half pages of arithmetical
formulas, so complex that only an expert mathematician can apply them.
The Dixon-Yates contract reads like a corporate trust indenture. Its
text takes up fifty-six printed pages of the complaint in the action now
pending in the Court of Claims, and appendices and related memoranda
fill another twenty-eight pages.'
* Associate Professor, Cornell Law School.
1. U. S. Standard Form 32, General Provisions for Supply Contract, effective April 28,
1950, 1 CCH Gov't Contracts Rep., If 18,305.
2. 32 C.F.R. Subchapter A (Supp. 1955). Hereafter cited as ASPR.
3. ASPR § 7-103.
4. ASPR §§ 7-104, 7-106.
5. See, e.g., ASPR §§ 7-104.11, 7-104.12, 8-701(b), 12-604.
6. Petition, pp. 14-99, Missisippi Valley Generating Co. v. United States, Ct. CL,
filed Dec. 13, 1955.
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Faced with this sort of thing, it is no wonder the average lawyer is
tempted to throw up his hands. It is not surprising that the courts should
refer to "verbose and complicated Government writings," out of which
the contractor's "rights must be culled." 7 Nor is it wholly accidental that
some courts at least have declared the enterprise hopeless, and by apply-
ing the contra proJerentem rule, construing the contract most strongly
against the Government, worked out what they conceive to be an equita-
ble solution of a particular controversy, without paying too much atten-
tion to the precise language chosen.8
Is there a way out of this maze? Certainly there is no simple solution.
But there is a rational explanation for the complexity of Government
contracts and there are a few basic principles which are applicable to
their interpretation. The rest of this article will be devoted to setting
forth these principles, to outlining a few problems which remain un-
resolved, and to discussing certain court decisions involving the inter-
pretation of specific contract clauses which the writer believes to have
been incorrectly decided.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION
A. Reason for Complexity
Government contracts are complicated for a very simple reason: the
subject matter with which they deal is inherently complicated. The
Government buys virtually every type of product which the American
economy produces, from nuts and bolts to battleships, from aircraft to
rocket launchers. Some of these are "off-the-shelf" items, others are
manufactured to special order over a long period of time. Directly or
indirectly the Government contracts or subcontracts with almost every
major concern in the country, and with a very great number of small
business firms. The sheer volume involved is almost astronomical.
To meet this situation, a few basic forms, with variations, have been
devised: the supply contract, the construction contract, the contract for
research and development; each found in two basic types, fixed-price
or cost-reimbursement. For particular situations, more specialized forms
have been created, such as the master ship-repair contract, the facilities
contract, the engineering services contract, and so on.
Each of these forms is intended to cover, so far as can be anticipated,
7. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. v. United States, 126 Ct. C1. 100, 107, 113 F. Supp. 446, 449
(1953).
8. See cases discussed infra, pp. 222-40.
9. From March 1952 to January 1955 the Department of Defense placed $63,000,000,000
worth of contracts. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, Task Force Report on Military Procurement 25 (1955). The Department's inventory
in 1955 was estimated at $124,000,000,000. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1955, § 1, p. 1, col. 7.
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every situation which may be encountered by either party, from the
initial tooling up for production to final delivery and payment. Among
the subjects thus treated are variations in quantity, changes in specifica-
tions, patent rights, state and local taxes, Government-furnished prop-
erty, inspection, termination for default, termination for convenience,
price escalation, and many others.
In short, a Government contract is complicated for the same reason
that a corporate trust indenture or a securities registration statement is
complicated, namely the complexity of the economy with which these
instruments deal. There is no malice prepense involved in all this; it is
simply inherent in the nature of things.
There is a further factor, not present in the ordinary private transac-
tion. Congress has required the inclusion of a large number of clauses,
principally in the areas of social policy and ethical considerations. ° Ex-
amples are the labor clauses required by the Walsh-Healy Public Con-
tracts Act, 1 the Davis-Bacon Act,2' and the Eight-Hour Law,"3 as well as
such clauses as the "Covenant Against Contingent Fees, 1 4 and the
"Officials Not To Benefit" provision. 5 A few more are required by
Executive Order, such as the Anti-Discrimination Clause,1 and the
clause prohibiting the use of convict labor.17 But the vast majority of
clauses in actual use have been promulgated administratively. 8 This
brings us to the next topic, the manner in which these clauses are pre-
pared.
B. The Genesis of Standard Forms and Clauses
There is no question that the Government contract, with rare excep-
tions, is a "contract of adhesion," that is, a standard form, prepared by
one party and required of the other, designed to fit a wide variety of
situations by the filling in of appropriate blanks or the annexing of de-
tailed technical specifications, and with very little opportunity for varia-
tion. Such contracts of adhesions have become common in private deal-
ings. The insurance contract is a long-standing illustration. Most com-
10. See Miller, Government Contracts and Social Control: A Preliminary Inquiry, 41
Va. L. Rev. 27 (1955); Risik, Federal Government Contract Chutes and Forms, 23 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 125 (1954).
11. 41 US.C.A. § 35-45.
12. 40 US.C. §§ 276(a)-(c).
13. 40 U.S.CA. §§ 324-26.
14. ASPR § 7-103.20, required for negotiated contracts by 41 U.S.C.A. § 153(a), and
41 U.S.C.A. § 254(a).
15. ASPR § 7-103.19, required by 41 U.S.C.A. § 22.
16. ASPR § 12-S04, required by Exec. Order No. 10557, Sept. 3, 19S4, 3 C.F.R. 69
(Supp. 1954).
17. ASPR § 12-203, required by Exec. Order No. 325A, May 1, 1i905.
18. See Risik and Miller, op. cit. supra note 10.
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mercial concerns today use standard forms of purchase orders, agency
contracts, sales contracts, employment contracts, and the like. Obviously,
this sort of contractual instrument is a somewhat different creature from
the old-fashioned informal contract formed by an exchange of letters, the
first-year law student's "offer and acceptance." Trying to fit it into the
mold of case law developed around the latter is apt to produce some
strange results.19
At the same time, it must be pointed out that the Government contract
is not just a contract of adhesion, forced upon the unwilling contractor
by an arbitrary Government on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. On the con-
trary, it is the result of a long process of negotiation and bargaining, al-
though one which of necessity takes place on an over-all rather than an
individual basis. True, there can be no bargaining about the clauses
which are required by statute or executive order. But the rest of the
standard clauses are hammered out only after exhaustive discussions be-
tween representatives of the Government and industry. At these confer-
ences the Government is represented by experts from the procuring
agencies, industry by committees designated by the various trade associ-
ations whose members have the principal interest. Beside the more spe-
cialized associations, organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce
and the National Association of Manufacturers seek to protect the in-
terest of the small businessman and the general manufacturer. Lawyers,
accountants, purchasing agents, patent experts, and similar specialists
participate in these conferences, on both sides of the table.
As in all negotiations of this kind, there is a great deal of give and
take, points are conceded, first by one side, then the other, thorny issues
settled by compromise, and so on. In the final outcome, there usually re-
main only a few issues on which agreement cannot be reached. As to
these, the Government has the final say, but they are ordinarily resolved
at a high policy level, such as by an Under or Assistant Secretary of the
Department concerned. The over-all result is a contract of adhesion
which nevertheless represents a substantial measure of genuine agree-
ment, if not by the individual contractors concerned, at least by those
who speak for them.2"
Secondly, it should be pointed out that the forms and clauses thus
agreed upon are not fixed and unalterable. They are constantly being
reviewed and revised, as ambiguities, difficulties, or hardships appear.
19. See Miller, op. cit. supra note 10, at 56-57; Fain and Watt, War Procurement-A
New Pattern in Contracts, 44 Colum. L. Rev. 127 (1944); Symposium on "Compulsory
Contracts," 43 Colum. L. Rev. 569-752 (1943); Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 Harv. L.
Rev. 700 (1939).
20. It should be noted that these conferences are informal, and do not follow the rulo
making procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C.A. § 1003.
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Finally, no contractor need accept a form or a clause which he honestly
believes to be unsuited for his particular situation. If he or his lawyer be-
lieves that a legitimate reason exists for a deviation from the standard
language, he should not hesitate to request one.2 1 Such deviations are
not favored, especially where they would result in unfairly preferring
one contractor over another, but where this is not the case, and good
reasons are adduced for the deviation requested, it stands a reasonably
good chance of being granted.
C. On Understanding a Government Contract
The lawyer whose client is considering entering into a Government
contract for the first time has no easy task. Properly to advise his
client, he must understand the document which the client is asked to sign.
Naturally, the first thing to do is to read it. This presents no particular
problem in any given case, because the prospective contractor will have
been furnished with a copy.
But to acquaint oneself on an over-all basis with the contract forms
currently in use, or to compare the form issued to the contractor with the
forms officially promulgated, is not quite so easy. Theoretically, all this
information should be available in the Code of Federal Regulations.2-
But the Code is not always up to date, and must be supplemented by
reference to the daily issues of the Federal Register. Even then, sur-
prising lacunae appear. For example, one consulting the Code would
assume that Standard Form 23 is the approved, official form currently
in use for construction contracts. It says so, quite unmistakablyP No-
where does it appear that on March 19, 1953, General Services Adminis-
tration issued its General Regulation No. 13, promulgating a new form,
23a, General Provisions (Construction Contract), superseding, at least
in part, the older form.24 Standard Form 32, "General Provisions for
Supply Contract," prescribed by General Services Administration in
1949,25 is quite different from Standard Form 32, "Contract for Supplies,"
as found in the Code.26 This sort of thing seems inexcusable. But the
situation nevertheless exists.2 7
The best solution is to arm oneself with the Government Contracts
21. The procedure to be followed, in the case of Department of Dafenza contracts, i
set forth in ASPR § 1-109.
22. 44 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-14, as amended, 44 U.S.CA. § 311 (Supp. 19S5); 5 U.S.CA.
§ 1002.
23. 44 CY.R. § 54.13 (Supp. 1955).
24. 1 CCH Gov't Contracts Rep. g 18,202 (1953).
25. 1 CCH Gov't Contracts Rep. f 18,305 (1949).
26. 44 C.F.R. § 54.21 (Supp. 1955). See also 41 U.S.CA. § 54.21.
27. See Newman, Government and Ignorance-A Progress Report on Publication of
Federal Regulations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 929 (1950).
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Service,28 an unofficial publication which does a remarkable job in
keeping up to date on all current changes in this whole area. Another
solution is to subscribe to the Government Printing Office bulletins an-
nouncing new publications, and order all copies of new or revised regula-
tions as soon as they are promulgated, without waiting for them to
appear in the Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations.
Having found the form and read it, the next problem is to understand
it. The difficulties in doing so have been exaggerated. The cardinal rule
is that the contract means exactly what it says. There are no hidden
meanings, no "traps for the unwary," no deliberate ambiguities. The form
may sound verbose and complicated, but if one will have the patience to
read it carefully, line by line, and word by word, it will become reason-
ably clear.
If one still has difficulty, one should seek help in the writings of the
specialists. There are not many good texts; most of the standard works
are out of date. But Lupton's Government Contracts Simplified0 is a
good, compact work which explains most of the clauses currently in use.
Much useful material has appeared in the law reviews.80 Many seminars
and institutes on problems in the area of Government contracting have
been conducted in recent years, sponsored by bar associations and law
schools." The proceedings of these institutes, if they can be obtained,
will often prove invaluable.
Finally, one should consult the court decisions, especially those of
the United States Supreme Court and the Court of Claims. These can
be misleading, however, because they often involve contract clauses or
forms which have since been superseded. And occasionally, as the writer
hopes to show below, they seem to be based on a misunderstanding of
the clause or form involved.
28. CCH Gov't Contracts Rep., vols. 1, 1A, 2.
29. Lupton, Government Contracts Simplified (1953).
30. See, e.g., the articles on construction contracts appearing in prior issues of this
review, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 535, 556, 588 (1956), 25 Fordham L. Rev. 1 (1956), and on
the disputes clause, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 11 (1956). Comprehensive bibliographies have
been published in 12 Fed. BJ. 334 (1952), and by the Law Branch of the Army Library,
Bibliography on Government Procurement, etc. (1954).
31. An Institute on "Some Practical Aspects of Government Construction Contract
Law," sponsored by the Fordham University School of Law and the Federal Bar Associa-
tion (Empire State Chapter) was held at Fordham on December 2 and 3, 1955. The
George Washington University Law School has sponsored three such Institutes, the first on
Government Contracts generally (1954), the second on Termination of Defense Contracts
(1955), and the third (in co-operation with the Federal Bar Association) on Subcontractor
Problems (1956).
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D. The Contra Proferentem Ride
If, despite the steps suggested above, ambiguities in a Government
contract still remain, they will be resolved against the Government as
the draftsman. There is no question about this rule. It has been applied
from the earliest times to date 2 The statement to the contrary in a
recent law review note33 cannot be supported.
The writer's only quarrel is with those who would apply this rule too
hastily, without making an honest effort to understand what the contract
really does say. In the old days, the rule was a standard war-horse in the
case of the insurance contract. Now that insurance policies have become
widely standardized, often by statute, some courts at least are willing to
ascribe to them their ordinary meaning, without straining to discover an
ambiguity to resolve against the insurance company. 4 Perhaps it is time
to adopt a similar approach in the case of the Government contract.
E. Law Applicable to Government Contracts
It is now well settled (after some initial vacillation on the part of the
lower courts) that in interpreting a Government contract, or in deciding
any other question of law arising thereunder, federal law applies. The
rule of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins30 has no bearing on the situation.
And since the federal law controls, conflict theories based on the place of
contracting, or of performance, or of payment, or on the "center of
gravity"37 are irrelevant. Basically this law is to be sought in the United
States statutes and in the regulations promulgated thereunder. But
where these are silent, resort must be had to a general body of law which
can only be characterized as a federal "common law" of Government
32. Garrison v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 633, 690 (1S63); United States v.
Lennox Metal Mfg. Co., 225 F.2d 302, 315 (2d Cir. 1955); Appeal of Fluor Corp, IBCA-53,
6 C.C.F. U 61,777 (1956); JAGT 1954/10233, Dept. of the Army Circ. 715-50-4 (Pro-
curement Legal Service) par. 3, p. 3.
33. Note, Contractors' Problems Under the Standardized Government Contract, 30
Ind. LJ. 60, 65 (1954).
34. Neas v. Home Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Tex. 1955); Lib-
erty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 126 F. Supp. 943 (D. Del. 1954), rev'd,
224 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1955).
35. United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Clearfidd Trust Co.
v. United States, 31S U.. 363, 366-67 (1943); United States v. Lennox Metal Mfg. Co,
225 F.2d 302, 307 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v. Jones, 176 F.2d 273, 281 (9th Cir.
1949). See Pofcher, The Choice of Law, State or Federal, in Cases Involving Government
Contracts, 12 La. L. Rev. 37 (1951); Notes, 34 Cornell L.Q. 110 (1943), 59 Harv. L. Rev.
966 (1946); 67 Harv. L. Rev. 347 (1953); 53 Colum. L. Rev. 991 (1953); Comment, 40
Cornell L.Q. 561, 566-71 (1955).
36. 304 U.S. 64 (193S).
37. Auten v. Auten, 303 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
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contracts, especially since in a few instances it departs from generally
accepted common law contract principles.88
On the other hand, it is equally settled that questions arising under
subcontracts are determined by local law, including any applicable
conflict-of-laws rules.39 This is on the theory that there is no privity of
contract between the Government and the subcontractor. The rule has
been criticized, and the suggestion made that the relations between a Gov-
ernment prime contractor and his subcontractor should also be governed
by federal law,4" but so far, at least, the courts have not accepted this idea.
The rule of no privity may, however, be modified by federal statute.
Thus, the Contract Settlement Act of 194441 included numerous provi-
sions affecting subcontractors.4  The Renegotiation Act of 195 14 is
another example.
Moreover, the rule of no privity may be eroded by requirements which
the Government imposes on its prime contractors affecting their rela-
tions with their subcontractors. Thus, if a statute, regulation or contract
provision requires that a prime contractor include a particular contract
clause in his subcontracts, he must do so or be in default. Whether such
subcontract clause, when inserted, is then to be interpreted under federal
or state law is, however, another question. It is submitted that the state
courts would be bound to follow the federal courts in construing such
clauses, where the text thereof is specifically required by a federal statute,
but not where it is merely a matter of contractual arrangement between
38. See, e.g., United States v. Lipman, 122 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Refining
Associates, Inc. v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 115, 109 F. Supp. 259 (1953).
39. Edward E. Morgan Co. v. United States for Use and Benefit of Pelphrey, 230 F,2d
896 (5th Cir. 1956); Southern Painting Co. of Tennessee v. United States, 222 F.2d 431
(10th Cir. 1955); United States v. Duby, 201 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1952); United States for
Use and Benefit of Lichter v. Henke Construction Co., 157 F.2d 13 (8th Cir. 1946) ; United
States for Use and Benefit of Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. H. R. Henderson & Co., 126 F.
Supp. 626 (W.D. Ark. 1955).
40. Feldman, The Subcontractor's Relationship to the Government, 12 Fed. B.J. 299,
308-09 (1952).
41. 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-25, as amended, 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 114(a), 117(d) (Supp. 1955).
See especially 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 107, 109.
42. See, e.g., Rumsey Mfg. Corp. v. United States Hoffman Machinery Corp., 187
F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1951) (subcontractor may elect either his statutory remedy under the
Contract Settlement Act, or his common-law remedy, but he cannot claim benefits of
both); Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc. v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 95, 109 F. Supp. 402
(1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 831 (1953), noted in 21 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 638 (1953)
(Government is not required by Contract Settlement Act to settle directly with subcontrac-
tor, but may elect to do so).
43. 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 1211-33, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 1212, 1215(d)(f),
1216(a)(c), 1231(h) (Supp. 1955).
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the Government and the prime contractor. But authority on this point
is scant."
As a practical matter, the Government can control relations between a
prime and a sub by refusing to reimburse the prime for payments made
under subcontracts which have not been approved by the Contracting
Officer, if the prime contract includes such a requirement. 5 The same
thing is true of settlements of claims between a prime and a sub, if ap-
proval of such settlements is required.40 But, and this is often misunder-
stood, the existence of this veto power does not affect the legal relation
between the prime and the sub.47 The former is free to pay if he wishes;
he may even be obligated to do so. It is solely a question whether he is
then going to be reimbursed by the Government or be out of pocket.45
Naturally, no prime contractor is going to pay in such a situation, if he
can avoid it, unless he is assured of reimbursement. The result is that in
many areas the Government, as a practical matter, does control relations
between a prime and a sub, whatever the legal theories may be.
IL A PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION: LAW VERsus FACT
The supposed dichotomy between law and fact is important in all
areas of administrative law. 9 Government contracts are no exception,
44. On the effect of the Renegotiation Act on subcontractors, see Barton, Renegotiation
of Government Contracts, §§ 7.4, 7.6, 7.7 (1952).
The Davis-Bacon Act applies expressly to subcontracts as vwell as prime contracts, and
both must include the required stipulations. 40 U.S.C.A. § 276(a).
Some courts have held that an agent, hired to obtain Government contracts on a con-
tingent fee basis, is barred from recovery by the policy underlying the statutory (or execu-
tive order) Covenant against Contingent Fees, which literally binds only the contractor.
Le John Mfg. Co. v. Webb, 222 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Mitchell v. Flinthote
Co., 185 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 931 (1951). Contra, Gendron
v. Jacoby, 337 Mich. 150, 59 N.W.2d 128 (1953); Buckley v. Coyne Electrical School,
Inc., 343 Il. App. 420, 99 NYE.2d 370 (1951). Cf. Eastern Woodworks Inc. v. Vance, 205
Md. 419, 112 A.2d 231 (1955). See Note, Recovery of Contingent Fees for the Procure-
ment of Federal Government Contracts, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 12E0 (1956); McClelland, The
Covenant Against Contingent Fees as a Method of Eliminating the "5-Percenter," 41 Cornell
L.Q. 399 (1956).
45. ASPR § 7-203.S, for use in cost reimbursement type supply contract% is an example
of a clause requiring such approval.
46. ASPR §§ 8-51S, 8-701(b)(5), 8-702(b)(5), require such approval of settlements
of terminated subcontracts, with certain exceptions.
47. See Everberg, Rights of the Contractors and Subcontractors of War Goods, 57 Com.
L.J. 313 (1952).
43. Judgments obtained by subcontractors against their primes will normally be re-
imbursed, subject to certain conditions. ASPR § 8-518.8.
49. See Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 239 (1955); judicial
Review: Question of Fact, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1020 (1956); Stern, Review of Findings of
Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 93-124
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but this particular phase of the problem has not received much attention
from the commentatorsr 0 A thorough treatment of the subject is beyond
the scope of this article, but one aspect of it has a direct bearing on the
interpretation of Government contracts.
The problem is high-lighted by the following provision of the Act of
May 11, 1954, the so-called Wunderlich legislation:
"No Government contract shall contain a provision making final on a question of
law the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board." 5' 1
The immediate occasion for the enactment of this legislation was the
decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Wunderlich, 2 holding
that under the standard "Disputes Clause" a determination by the con-
tracting officer of a dispute concerning a question of fact, affirmed on
appeal by the head of the department, was final and conclusive, and could
not be set aside by the courts, unless actual fraud was alleged and
proved. Section 1 of the Act of May 11, 1954, broadened the scope of
judicial review to embrace determinations found to be" . .. capricious or
arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or...
not supported by substantial evidence."53
Section 2 of the Act, however, deals with a somewhat different problem,
the setting for which was provided by the decision of the Supreme Court
in United States v. Moorman. 4 Prior to the Wunderlich legislation, dis-
putes clauses in Government contracts were of two types, those limited
to disputes of fact, and those not so limited (sometimes called "All Dis-
putes" clauses). The Court of Claims had consistently held, however,
that even under an all disputes clause, an administrative determination of
a question of law was not final but was subject to judicial reviewY5 The
Court of Claims held that any question involving the interpretation of
a Government contract was a question of law, and applied this rule to
the interpretation of technical contract specificationsY
(1944); Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 899 (1943); Davis,
Administrative Law, § 245 (1951).
50. But see Joy, The Disputes Clause in Government Contracts: A Survey of Court
and Administrative Decisions, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 11, 20-22 (1956).
51. 41 U.S.C.A. § 322 (Supp. 1955).
52. 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
53. 41 U.S.C.A. § 321 (Supp. 1955).
54. 338 U.S. 457 (1949).
55. Moorman v. United States, 113 Ct. Cl. 159, 82 F. Supp. 1010 (1949), rev'd, 338 US.
457 (1949); Pfotzer v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 184, 227, 77 F. Supp. 390, 400, cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 885 (1948); Callahan Constr. Co. v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 538, 616
(1940).
56. Farwell Co. v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 317, 115 F. Supp. 477 (1953); Binghamton
Constr. Co. v. United States, 123 Ct. CI. 804, 839, 107 F. Supp. 712, 733 (1952).
(Vol. 25
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
This view of the Court of Claims received a setback in United States
v. Moorman 7 in which the Supreme Court held that under an all dis-
putes clause, a decision by the Contracting Officer, affirmed by the War
Department Board of Contract Appeals, involving the interpretation of
contract specifications and drawings, was final and binding upon the
parties. The Court reached this result, however, without expressly de-
ciding the issue whether a dispute concerning the meaning of contract
specifications was a question of law or fact. The Court leaned to the view
that such a dispute was a question of fact, but thought it unnecessary to
consider the question, because it was clear that by the all-disputes clause
the parties intended to make the Contracting Officer's decision final and
binding, subject only to administrative appeal, and the Court held that
such a contract provision was valid and enforceable.58
It is by no means clear that the Act of May 11, 1954, changes the
precise result of the Moornan case. For that statute, in outlawing
finality provisions on questions of law, does not define the term "ques-
tion of law" and, specifically, does not say whether the interpretation of
technical contract specifications is a question of law or fact. Certainly a
case can be made for the proposition, as suggested by the Supreme Court
in the Moorman case, that it is a question of fact. The dispute in that
case was whether the contractor was required to grade a proposed taxi-
way for an aircraft assembly plant, under a contract for grading the site
of the plant, "in strict accordance with the specifications, schedules and
drawings." The taxiway was shown on the drawings, but was not lo-
cated within the plant site as described in the specifications. From one
point of view, this was a question of resolving inconsistent contract pro-
visions, a question of law in the traditional sense. From another, it was
a question of ascertaining the meaning of engineering drawings and
specifications, a question of fact for technical experts to decide.
Whatever the final answer of the Supreme Court may be, the Court of
Claims has made it clear that under the Wunderlici: legislation it will not
be bound by findings of a Contracting Officer which involve the interpre-
tation of contract specificationsP9
The picture is somewhat confused by the recent case of United States
v. Looney," decided by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Here
the contract included the following provision:
57. 338 U.S. 457 (1949), reversing 113 Ct. CL 159, 82 F. Supp. 1010 (1949).
58. Id. at 462-63.
59. Wagner Whirler and Derrick Corp. v. United States, 128 Ct. CL 382, 393-94, 121
F. Supp. 664, 671 (1954), noted in 40 Cornell L.Q. 355 (1955).
60. 226 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1955). Cf. United States for Benefit of Lanehart v. United
Enterprises, Inc., 226 F.2d 359 (Sth Cir. 1955).
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"C. Interpretation of Specifications. On all questions relating to the acceptability
of material or machinery, classification of materials, the proper execution of the work,
and the interpretation of these specifications, the decision of the contracting officer,
or his duly authorized representatives, shall be final." 6'
The precise question was whether the Contracting Officer's construction
of certain other sections found in the contract specifications amounted to
an "interpretation of the specifications" within the meaning of the
contract provision quoted above. The court held that it did and that it
was final and binding, despite the fact that the Contracting Officer was
not making a finding on a technical engineering question, but was inter-
preting language of the specifications as constituting a condition rather
than a warranty. This would seem pretty clearly to be a question of law.
The court did not say whether it was a question of law or fact, but
merely held, citing the Moorman case, that the contract provision as to
finality was broad enough to cover it, and that such provision was valid
and enforceable.
The case was decided after the enactment of the Wunderlich legisla-
tion, but involved a contract made beforehand. Therefore section 2 of
the Act of May 11, 1954, did not apply.2 It is interesting, however, that
the court did not even discuss the statute. It seems clear that, on the
precise facts, the act, if applicable, would have compelled a different re-
sult. It is not so clear, however, what the result would be under the act
(except in the Court of Claims) if the dispute were to involve a technical
engineering question arising under the specifications. This question will
have to await clarification by the Supreme Court.
III. SOME EXAMPLES OF MISINTERPRETATION
In general, the courts have performed admirably the difficult task of
interpreting Government contracts and developing a body of case law
in this area. Occasionally, however, they have rendered decisions which
to the writer seem unsupportable. In each such case it is submitted that
the error has arisen from treating a particular clause or a specific con-
troversy in isolation, without considering the entire context of statute
law, regulation, policy and procedure in which it arises.
Three specific cases have been chosen for discussion. If the criticism
of these cases seems severe, it should be remembered that they are not
necessarily representative of the huge volume of such cases being decided
every year. But two of the three have been widely cited, and promise to
have an influence out of proportion to their possible intrinsic importance.
The third contains language about the verbosity and complexity of Gov-
61. 226 F.2d at 145.
62. § 2 operates only as to future contracts, unlike § 1 which applies to any suit "now
filed or to be filed." 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 321, 322 (Supp. 1955).
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ernment contracts which has been seized upon by those eager to pro-
claim that such contracts are in truth incomprehensible.
The writer does not claim that the actual result reached in each of
these cases was necessarily wrong, on the facts and as between the
parties. It is the route by which this result was reached, and the violence
done to the intention and meaning of the clauses involved, which give
him concern.
A. The Disputes Clause and the Sunroc Case
The clause here construed and applied by the court was the following
version of the standard disputes clause:
"Except as otherwise specifically provided in this contract, all disputes concerning
questions of fact arising under this contract shall be decided by the contracting officer,
subject to written appeal by the contractor within 30 days to the head of the depart-
ment concerned or his duly authorized representative, whose decision shall be final
and conclusive upon the parties hereto. In the meantime the contractor shall dili-
gently proceed with performance." 63
This was a form of disputes clause in common use before the Wunder-
lick legislation, discussed above, and was substantially the same as that
construed by the Supreme Court in the Wunderlich case.
After Wunderliclh, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania had before it the case of Sunroc Refrigeration Co. v.
United States. 4 This case involved conflicting claims concerning water
coolers and refrigerators shipped by the contractor to the Navy. Some
of these proved to be defective. Some of the defective coolers were re-
turned to the contractor; some were not. Some of the items so returned
were replaced by the contractor; some were not.
The contractor claimed $9,985 as the contract price of items de-
livered and not returned. The Government claimed a refund of $9,759.20
for items returned and not replaced. Involved in this controversy were
such questions as the effect of inspection and acceptance prior to ship-
ment; whether the defects were attributable to faulty manufacture or to
damage in transit; and whether the Government or the contractor was
responsible for damage in transit.
Discussions between the Navy and the contractor having failed, the
contractor presented his claim to the General Accounting Office for
settlement.65 The General Accounting Office, in accordance with its usual
63. Sunroc Refrigeration Co. v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 131, 133 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
64. 104 F. Supp. 131 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
65. The record shows that this is what happened. The court's statement that the Navy
referred the matter to the General Accounting Office for settlement is erroneous. The au-
thority of the General Accounting Office to settle such claims is found in 31 U.S.C.A. § 71.
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practice, asked the Navy for a recommendation and report.00 Before
making such report, the Navy held further conferences with the con-
tractor. This time the parties agreed on a proposed settlement which
could be recommended to the General Accounting Office. The Contract-
ing Officer prepared a report in which he stated the facts, insofar as they
could be determined (many remained uncertain), and recommended that
the controversy be settled by a payment to the contractor of $3,573. It
was clear from this report that the recommended settlement would in-
volve, inter alia, a resolution of controverted responsibility for damages
and alleged unsatisfactory performance.
The Contracting Officer sent this report and recommendation to the
General Accounting Office, with a statement that it had the contractor's
concurrence. A copy was sent to the contractor for his information.
The General Accounting Office refused to accept the recommended
settlement, but affirmed the Government's original claim of $9,759.20.
After setting off an amount admittedly due the contractor under another
transaction, it found a balance due the Government.
The contractor sued in the District Court for $3,573, the amount of
the recommended settlement, plus the amount admittedly due on the
other transaction, a total of $8,339.70. The court held that the Con-
tracting Officer's report and recommendation constituted a final deter-
mination, which the General Accounting Office had no authority to review
or change. The court cited the Wunderlich case, and also Leeds &
Northrup Co. v. United States,6 and James Graham Mfg. Co. v. United
States,6 in support of this conclusion. 9
It is submitted that the court erred. The report and recommendation
of the Contracting Officer were not, and did not purport to be, the settle-
ment of a dispute under the disputes clause of the contract. This clause
had not been invoked by either party. On the contrary, the Navy had
disclaimed authority to settle the controversy, and the contractor had
voluntarily presented his claim to the General Accounting Office for settle-
ment under the latter's statutory authority.70
66. The court was dearly in error in saying that the General Accounting Office may
have returned the file to the Navy Department because of the Contract Settlement Act, 41
U.S.C.A. §§ 101-25 (1952), as amended, 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 114(a), 117(d) (Supp. 1955). The
contract here had not been terminated and the Contract Settlement Act was in no way
involved.
67. 101 F. Supp. 999 (ED. Pa. 1951).
68. 91 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Cal. 1950).
69. Cf. Bell Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 398, 100 F. Supp. 661 (1951),
aff'd by equally divided Court, 344 U.S. 860 (1952). And see Cable, The General Account-
ing Office and Finality of Decisions of Government Contracting Officers, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
780 (1952).
70. See note 65 supra.
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It is true that the Contracting Officer's report included a section some-
what inartistically labeled "'Findings of Fact." But this should not have
obscured the true nature of the action taken, which was clear from the
report taken as a whole. The court misread the Contracting Officer's
report, and seized upon a mere caption therein to convert it into some-
thing it was never intended to be. Moreover, the court's statement that
the Contracting Officer made " ... factual determinations as to the only
items in dispute... the amount of the damage and the responsibility
therefor,"7' is open to question. Neither the Court of Claims nor the Gen-
eral Accounting Office have ever conceded that questions of legal responsi-
bility for damages, or claims for breach of contract, are questions of
fact.' The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals has disclaimed
any authority to rule with finality on such questions, and usually declines
jurisdiction unless there is also an issue of fact involved.73 And a fortiori,
under the Wunderlich legislation discussed above, today no ruling of a
Contracting Officer or administrative appeal board can be final on such
a question.74
If the court in the Sunroc case had considered the controversy on the
merits, and had resolved the issues of liability against the Government,
the writer would have had no quarrel with the result. But the court
never reached these issues.
In fairness to the court, it should be pointed out that the Assistant
United States Attorney who tried the case seems to have invited this
result. The record shows that the trial was confined to the receipt of
documentary evidence and oral testimony concerning the report and rec-
ommendation of the Contracting Officer, following which Government
counsel asked the court to rule on the force and effect of the "Findings of
Fact" and to decide whether the case came within the scope of the
Wuinderlic rule.
The Government did not appeal this decision. The amount involved
was small, and the situation somewhat special, not apt to recur under
precisely the same set of circumstances. But the case has been frequently
cited as an illustration of the WVunderlich rule. In the opinion of the
writer, it is not a correct application of that rule. Actually, it is an illus-
tration of what can happen when a court fails to understand, or have
properly explained to it, the administrative processes followed in han-
71. 104 F. Supp. at 133.
72. Railroad Waterproofing Corp. v. United States, - CL C. -, 137 F. Supp. 713
(1956); 34 Comp. Gen. 565 (1955); 34 Comp. Gen. 676 (1955); 4 Comp. Gen. 404 (1924).
73. Surplus Outlet, Inc, ASBCA No. 2723, 6 C.C.F. U 61,829 (19S5); Specialzed Prod-
ucts Co, ASBCA No. 2365, 6 C.C.F. ff 61,823 (1955); Tallen Co., ASBCA No. 2305, 6
C.C.F. ff 61,334 (1955); Stainless Steel Corp., ASBCA No. 2523, 6 C.C.F. g 61,E43 (1955).
74. Except as to contracts executed prior to May 11, 1954.
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dling claims by Government contractors, including those arising under
the disputes clause and those arising outside the scope of that clause."
B. The Uniform Termination Article and the Elastic Stop Nut Case
The Elastic Stop Nut case76 involved, among other things, the mean-
ing of subsection (f) of the Uniform Termination Article. This article
was prescribed for use under the Contract Settlement Act of 1944. 7 It
was a comprehensive outline of the rights and duties of the parties in the
event of termination of a war contract for the convenience of the Gov-
ernment. 71 Subsection (f) was a provision for equitable price adjust-
ment, which read as follows:
"In the event that, prior to the determination of the final amount to be paid to
the Contractor as in this Article provided, the Contractor shall file with the Con-
tracting Officer a request in writing that an equitable adjustment should be made in
the price or prices specified in the contract for the work not terminated by the Notice
of Termination the appropriate fair and reasonable adjustment shall be made in such
price or prices."'79
What this clause meant was this. It was recognized that if a contract
was terminated in part, rather than as a whole, so that the contractor
still had to deliver a certain portion of the items originally called for, it
might not be equitable to hold him to the original contract price per item.
Accordingly, in the event of such a partial termination, the contract was
divided, as it were, into three parts:
(i) Completed Portion of the Contract-as to items completed and ac-
cepted by the Government prior to the effective date of termination, the
contractor would be paid at the contract rate.80
(ii) Terminated Portion of the Contract-as to items not to be com-
75. In contrast with the Sunroc case stands the decision of another District Court In
Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Va. 1955). The
Contracting Officer had asserted a claim against the contractor for damages caused by negli-
gence in performing stevedoring. No reference was made to the disputes clause, and no
attempt was made to follow the procedure therein outlined. Yet Government counsel
tried to claim the benefit of that clause and argued that the Contracting Officer's finding
of liability was final and binding. The court properly held that the disputes clause had no
application.
76. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 100, 113 F. Supp. 446 (1953).
For subsequent proceedings in this case see 132 Ct. Cl. 631, 132 F. Supp. 466 (1955).
77. 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-25, as amended, 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 114(a), 117(d) (Supp. 1955).
78. The text of the Joint Termination Regulation may be found in 1 CCH War Law
Service-Government Contracts, 1111 0,111-12,402 (1945). The Uniform Termination Article
is found in 1 CCH War Law Service-Government Contracts ff 8001 (1945). The text of
this article is also set forth in the court's findings of fact in the Elastic Stop Nut case,
126 Ct. Cl. at 111-15 (1953).
79. Ibid.
80. Uniform Termination Article, subsection (d) (1).
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pleted, the contractor would be paid an amount intended to compensate
him for all his work done and costs incurred on such items prior to the
effective date of termination, plus a fair profit on work done.8'
(iii) Portion of the Contract Not Terminated-as to items not com-
pleted, but yet not terminated, the contractor would continue to receive
payment at the contract rate, unless he requested and obtained an equita-
ble adjustment in the price of such items, as provided in subsection (f).
This scheme is clear and understandable, once explained. But the con-
tract clause was ambiguous, in that it used the phrase "work not termi-
nated by the Notice of Termination" to refer to work still to be done,
instead of a more explicit phrase such as "continued portion of the con-
tract." Accordingly, the claim was made from time to time that the
phrase referred to items already completed (since in a literal sense these
items also constituted work not terminated by the Notice of Termina-
tion), and that as to such items the contractor could obtain an equitable
adjustment. But this attempted construction was ruled erroneous, first
by the Appeal Board of the Office of Contract Settlement in Gardner &
Son v. War Department,2 and then by the United States Court of Ap-
peals in Rubin v. United States.8 3 Both cases squarely held that the pro-
vision for equitable adjustment applied only to the continued portion of
the contract, and had no application to items delivered and accepted
prior to the effective date of termination. The Rubin case is clear and
decisive on the point.
The Elastic Stop Nut case was a good deal more complicated than the
Rubin case, and greater equities appeared in favor of the contractor.
But on the question of the meaning of subsection (f) of the Uniform
Termination Article, the legal issue was identical.
The contract in question (No. 1932) called for the production of
1,011,000 fuzes at plaintiff's plant in New Jersey at $1.58 a unit. This
contract contained a price revision clause. The contractor was also manu-
facturing the same type fuze at its plant in Nebraska under a separate
contract (No. 828). As a result of experience at both plants, it was mu-
tually agreed to transfer all production to Nebraska. It was decided to
terminate Contract No. 1932 for the convenience of the Government, and
to double production under the Nebraska contract. Accordingly, under
date of February 22, 1945, the Government sent a Notice of Termina-
tion to the contractor, which included the following:
"You are notified that your Contract No. W-30-069-ORD-1932 ... is hereby termi-
nated (in part) for the convenience of the Government. Such termination will be
effective: solely as to 931,000 units of Item A... as soon as you have delivered un-
81. Id., subsections (c),(d) (2).
82. 1 O.C.S. Appeal Board, Proceeding No. 3,3 C.C.F. 1005 (194S).
83. 167 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1948).
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der the Contract 80,000 units of such Item A, including those heretofore delivered.
The Contract is further terminated as to any of said 80,000 units not completed on
28 February 1945. The remainder of the Contract is not affected by this notice." 84
On February 23, 1945, the contractor signed a no-cost settlement
agreement, waiving any claim against the Government under the termi-
nated portion of Contract No. 1932.
On February 28, 1945, the total number of units completed under the
contract was 54,250, leaving a balance of 956,750 canceled by virtue of
the termination notice.
Later, the contractor sought to reopen the no-cost settlement agree-
ment on the ground that it was based on mutual mistake, in that the
parties had not intended that the contractor waive his rights to price
revision as to the completed items. The Contracting Officer denied any
relief. The contractor appealed to the Appeal Board of the Office of Con-
tract Settlement, 5 which held:8 "
(i) The effective date of termination was February 28, 1945;
(ii) The termination notice canceled all production in excess of 80,000
units, or in excess of the number of units completed by February 28,
1945, whichever figure should be less;
(iii) The intention of the transaction as a whole was to leave the
parties in the same position as if production had been transferred to the
Nebraska plant by transfer of Contract No. 1932 as a continuing instru-
ment, instead of by the termination-new contract device actually chosen;
(iv) The no-cost settlement agreement waived all claims with respect
to the terminated portion of the contract (i.e. the 956,750 uncompleted
items), and there was no basis for a claim of mutual mistake;
(v) The settlement agreement did not bar the contractor's claim for
price revision as to the 54,250 completed items, but the contractor had
not met the necessary conditions for relief under the price revision clause
of the contract, and furthermore, under the terms of that clause, the
contractor's only remedy upon refusal of the Contracting Agency to
negotiate a revised price was to treat the contract as terminated under
the Uniform Termination Article, which gave no right to price revision
as to completed items:
"This clause has been authoritatively interpreted8 7 as providing for price adjust-
ment of items continued and not canceled, the cost of which is increased as a result
of termination. It does not afford a right to price revision for items completed on
the effective date of termination. 88
84. 126 Ct. Ci. at 121-22.
85. Established by § 13(d) of the Contract Settlement Act. 41 U.S.C.A. § 113(d).
86. 3 0.C.S. Appeal Board 97 (1948).
87. Citing the Rubin case, note 83 supra.
88. 3 0.C.S. Appeal Board 97, 103.
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The contractor then appealed to the Court of Claims, which reversed
the Appeal Board, and allowed an equitable adjustment on the completed
items.s9 The court thought that the Appeal Board had " ... overlooked,
or failed to see the significance of article 12 (f).... 11o Now the Appeal
Board had certainly not overlooked article 12(f), and if it had mis-
interpreted it, it was in good company.'
The Court of Claims had an alternative basis for its decision, namely,
that the no-cost settlement agreement did not reflect the intent of the
parties and that therefore the plaintiff was entitled to have it reformed. 2
This approach might have some justification under the facts of the case.
If the court had chosen to rest its ruling squarely on this ground, it
might not have been necessary for it to upset the accepted interpretation
of the equitable adjustment clause. 3 However ambiguous this clause may
have been, it was part of the Uniform Termination Article authorized
under the Contract Settlement Act. This article was promulgated as part
of the Joint Termination Regulation by the War and Navy Depart-
ments in 1944.01 Over sixty-five billion dollars worth of contracts con-
taining this article, or prior versions thereof which were similar in
effect, 95 were terminated and settled under the act. 0 In addition, the
89. 126 Ct. Cl. 100, 113 F. Supp. 446 (1953). Technically, the proceeding is a suit de
novo, not an appeal. 41 U-S.C.A. § 113(d) (2).
90. Id. at 107, 113 F. Supp. at 449.
91. The court said that under Article 12(f): " ... the contractor was entitled to such
an adjustment as of right, and was not merely dependent upon the grace of the contract-
ing officer as to whether he should receive it or not." Id. at 107, 113 F. Supp. at 449.
But this implied criticism of the Appeal Board's ruling miscontrues the latter. The Appeal
Board had held: (i) Article 12(f) gave the contractor no right to price rev.iion for com-
pleted items; (ii) the price revision clause (Article 33) did provide for such price reviSion,
if the contractor met certain conditions (which he had not) and the contracting agency
granted it; (iii) if the contracting agency refused such price revision, the contractor's only
remedy under the contract was to treat the contract as terminated for convenience; (iv)
in that event, the termination for convenience clause (Uniform Termination Article) made
no provision for price revision as to completed items. This neat, almost geometric, argu-
ment may sound a little too pat, but after all, it is what the contract said, and the Court
of Claims should have paid some attention to it.
92. Id. at 108, 113 F. Supp. at 449.
93. In the subsequent proceedings in this case, the Court of Claims reiterated its
position that it had decided the claim under the equitable adjustment clause of the Uni-
form Termination Article, and not under the price revision clause of the contract. 132 F.
Supp. at 469.
94. Office of Contract Settlement, A History of War Contract Terminations and Settle-
ments 13 (1947).
95. See Malman, Policies and Procedures for the Termination of War Contracts, 10 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 449, 45S (1944).
96. Office of Contract Settlement, A History of War Contract Terminations and Settle-
ments 1 (1947).
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article was used in five times as many other contracts, dollar-wise, which
never were terminatedY It should not be lightly assumed that these
hundreds of thousands of contractors did not understand what the article
meant. It is all the more regrettable that the Court of Claims, the court
charged with expert knowledge of Government contracts, should have
given the clause a dubious interpretation.
In its opinion the court made this observation:
"The documents out of which the plaintiff's rights must be culled are verbose and
complicated Government writings. It was not remarkable that the plaintiff's repre-
sentative asked the Government's Chief of Terminations what they meant, and relied
upon his answer." 98
There is reason to believe that the court was referring, not so much to
the Uniform Termination Article, as to the Notice of Termination (which
was ineptly worded), the No-Cost Settlement Agreement, and various
accompanying memoranda exchanged by the parties. But this language
has been seized upon in later cases as a general indictment of the wording
of Goverment contracts. 9
The precise point is now academic, because the regulations and con-
tract clauses currently promulgated by the Department of Defense make
it clear that the equitable adjustment here referred to applies only to
the continued portion of a partially terminated contract, and not to com-
pleted items. 00 This is at the expense of adding another line to a contract
clause which already takes up four printed pages in the regulations.
Perhaps this is as good an illustration as any of the reason Government
contracts seem continually to become more, rather than less, compli-
cated.
C. The Partial Payments Clause and the Lennox Metal Case
The case of United States v. Lennox Metal Mfg. Co.1°1 involved the
standard Army Partial Payments Clause, which read, in pertinent part,
as follows:
"Partial payments, which are hereby defined as payments prior to delivery, on work
in progress for the Government under this contract, may be made upon the following
terms and conditions.
"(a) The Contracting Officer may, from time to time, authorize partial payments
to the Contractor upon property acquired or produced by it for the performance of
this contract: Provided, that such partial payments shall not exceed 75 percent of
the cost to the Contractor of the property upon which payment is made, which cost
97. Ibid.
98. 126 Ct. C1. at 107, 113 F. Supp. at 449.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Lennox Metal Mfg. Co., 225 F.2d 302, 315 (2d Cir. 1955).
100. ASPR §§ 8-206, 8-701(i).
101. 131 F. Supp. 717 (E.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 225 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1955), noted
in 41 Va. L. Rev. 1112 (1955).
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shall be determined from evidence submitted by the Contractor and which must be
such as is satisfactory to the Contracting Officer...
"(b) Upon the making of any partial payment under this contract, title to all parts,
materials, inventories, work in process and nondurable tools theretofore acquired
or produced by the Contractor for the performance of this contract, and properly
chargeable thereto under sound accounting practice, shall forthwith vest in the Gov-
ernment; and title to all like property thereafter acquired or produced by the Cor-
tractor for the performance of this contract and properly chargeable thereto as afore-
said shall vest in the Government forthwith upon said acquisition or production: Pro-
vided, that nothing herein shall deprive the Contractor of any further partial or final
payments due or to become due hereunder; or relieve the Contractor or the Govern-
ment of any of their respective rights or obligations under this contract.
"(c) In making payment for the supplies furnished hereunder, there shall be de-
ducted from the contract price therefor a proportionate amount of the partial pay-
ments theretofore made to the Contractor, under the authority herein contained." 10 2
The facts in the Lennox case were complicated and to some extent
controversial. The following, however, may be taken as more or less un-
disputed:
As of April 25, 1951, Lennox and the Army entered into a contract for
the manufacture of 887,500 metal ammunition boxes at a unit price of
$1.449, the total price being $1,285,987.50. Initial deliveries were to be
made by July 31, 1951, final deliveries by February 29, 1952. This con-
tract did not contain a partial payments clause.
Between August and November 1951 the Government issued a series
of change orders, making certain changes in the specifications and in
the method of packing. These changes delayed production and on Janu-
ary 31, 1952, the parties signed a supplemental agreement extending the
initial delivery date to February 1952, and excusing prior delays.
In February, 1952, Lennox requested a partial payment, and sub-
mitted a statement covering $437,285.39 of costs incurred. A represen-
tative of the Army told Lennox that it could receive a payment of 755
of its costs incurred, if the contract was amended to authorize partial
payments. On March 3, 1952, a supplemental agreement was executed to
include in the contract the partial payments clause set forth above. A
consideration of $3,279.64 (1% of 75% of the costs incurred) was
charged for this amendment.
Lennox requested a partial payment of $327,964.04, or 75% of its costs
incurred to date. The Army authorized $156,183.91. This amount, less
$3,279.64, was paid to Lennox on March 7, 1952.
The Army made further partial payments of $56,786.08 on June 2,
1952, and of $80,244.24 on July 24, 1952. This made a total paid, against
102. 32 C.F.R. § 596.150-1, 16 Fed. Reg. 4042 (1951). (The regulation now in effect
uses the term "progress payments," distinguishing these from "partial payments," now usld
in a different sense. 32 C.F.R. § 596.150-1 (1954). But the older form read "partial pay-
ments.")
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the original request of $327,964.04, of $293,214.23, less $3,279.64, a net
amount of $289,934.59.
In August, 1952, the Army issued another change order, which delayed
production further. Lennox spent, or incurred obligations for, about
$120,000 to comply with this change order.
On August 31, 1952, Lennox requested another partial payment of
$235,427. It notified the Army that production could not be resumed
until another partial payment was made. A representative of the Army
said that a partial payment would be forthcoming.
In October, 1952, the Chief of the New York Ordnance District sent
out a production team and a fiscal team to determine if Lennox could
complete the contract on time, indicating that if the reports were favor-
able the contract would be continued. The teams reported that Lennox
could perform, if it had the requisite financing, and that a progress pay-
ment plan to insure this had been worked out.
Lennox met its required delivery schedules in February, 1952. It made
no deliveries in March, 1952. April deliveries fell short of scheduled
requirements, but in May Lennox partially caught up. In June and
July, 1952, a steel strike occurred, and the monthly schedule of deliveries
was reduced, but Lennox failed to meet these reduced schedules. In
September, Lennox delivered only 3636 of the 50,000 boxes scheduled for
that month. It delivered another 252 boxes in October, as against a
delivery schedule of 50,000.
On October 20, 1952, the Contracting Officer notified Lennox of
his intention to terminate the contract for default, and he did so termi-
nate it on October 31, 1952. By that time, Lennox had delivered a total
of 141,676 boxes out of the 887,500 called for by the contract.
The Government then sued: (a) for possession of the property ac-
quired by the contractor, title to which had allegedly vested in the
Government under the partial payments clause, and (b) to recoup a
balance of $149,118.38, representing the partial payments previously
made of $289,934.59, less credits of $140,816.21 for boxes actually
delivered. Lennox counterclaimed for $656,729.39, plus interest, for
damages for breach of contract, and for amounts alleged to have been
wrongfully withheld.
The trial court denied any relief to the Government, and held that it
lacked jurisdiction to pass on Lennox's counterclaim. (Lennox is now
suing in the Court of Claims for $235,000.) The court made the fol-
lowing findings of fact (in addition to those set forth above) and con-
clusions of law, which were disputed by the Government: 10 3
103. Appellant's Appendix, pp. 55a-70a, United States v. Lennox Metal Mfg. Co., 225
F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1955).
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(i) That lack of production up to March 1952 was entirely the fault
of the Army; that production from March to June 1952 was substantially
in accord with the delivery schedules; that delays in production after
June 1952 were caused by the steel strike and by the Army's failure to
make partial payments as promised.
(ii) That Lennox made an honest effort to comply with the last change
order, that it incurred good costs of about $120,000 in connection there-
with, and that its request for a partial payment thereon was sound and
should have been honored; that the Army did not give Lennox a proper
opportunity to re-tool as required by this change order.
(iii) That the Government violated its agreement to make partial
payments and arbitrarily refused to recognize the terms thereof, and
therefore breached its contract.
(iv) That the termination for default was a breach of contract by the
Government.
Some collateral facts and circumstances have been omitted from the
above outline, but it is believed that it constitutes an adequate summary
of the essential facts involved. The record as a whole tells a sorry story,
all too familiar, of repeated and harassing change orders issued by the
Government, coupled with promises to insure adequate financing which
never should have been made, counterbalanced however by delayed and
unsatisfactory performance by the contractor.
Assessing the blame in a situation like this is not easy. To the writer,
it seems that the Army had some justification for losing patience with a
contractor who had repeatedly failed to meet his delivery schedules and
was demanding that the Government finance him as the price for per-
forming his contract. But accepting the court's finding that the contrac-
tor was not in default, and that, therefore, the termination for default was
unjustified, 104 it does not follow that the Government breached its con-
tract. Under the standard default clause (art. 11(e) of the Lennox
contract), as construed by the Armed Services Board of Contract Ap-
peals, 105 the effect of this is to convert a termination for default into a
termination for convenience. This greatly increases the contractor's
rights, but it has never been held to result in a forfeiture of the Govern-
ment's rights.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court. Before considering
the opinion of the Court of Appeals in detail, it might be well to state
the actual result of the trial court's decision, something which is obscured
104. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals has held that it is bound by thi-s
determination. Lennox Metal Mfg. Co., ASECA No. 2453 (1955), Dept. of the Army Cir.
715-50-25 (Procurement Legal Service), p. 2, Jan. 11, 1956.
I05. See Joy, The Disputes Clause in Government Contracts: A Survey of Court and
Administrative Decisions, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 11, 34 (1956).
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in the lengthy opinions of both the trial and appellate courts. The
Government had paid to the contractor, out of public funds, $289,934.59.
In return, it had received deliveries valued at $205,288.52. The Govern-
ment, that is to say the public treasury, was out of pocket at least
$84,646.07.16 For this the Government received nothing, neither a re-
coupment in cash nor any of the property against which its partial pay-
ments had been made. And yet the appellate court held that the con-
tractor had not been unjustly enriched, 107 and the trial court held that
it lacked jurisdiction to award the contractor damages on its counter-
claim. 8 Obviously, the contractor either was enriched, unjustly or
otherwise, or was receiving a pro tanto recovery on its claim for damages.
Moreover, both courts ignored the governing statute. Section 529,
Title 31, United States Code, prohibits any payments under contracts
for the delivery of articles of any description, for the use of the United
States, in excess of the value of articles delivered previously to such
payment.10 9 In the light of this statute, the Army regulation and con-
tract clause strictly limited partial payments to 75% of the cost of the
material used by the contractor in performing the contract, and provided
for the vesting of title to such property in the Government."10 These
requirements, based on statute, obviously limited the discretion and
authority of the Contracting Officer, regardless of the promises or repre-
106. This is a minimum figure. Actually, the Government claimed $149,11838 for un-
recouped partial payments. The difference of $64,472.31 is partially accounted for by
the $3,279.64 consideration charged for the amendment and by $36,862.65 asserted by the
Government as liquidated damages but denied by the court. The writer is unable to recon-
cile the remaining figure of $24,330.02 from information available in the briefs and opinions.
But it seems significant that the District Court, in its findings, found as a fact that the
Government had made partial payments of $293,214.23 and recouped therefrom $144,095.85.
Finding of Fact No. 36, Appellant's Appendix, p. 66a. This left an unrecouped balance of
$149,118.38, the precise amount claimed by the Government.
107. 225 F.2d at 318.
108. For a persuasive argument that the federal courts should be granted jurisdiction to
decide such counterclaims, see Whelan, A Government Contractor's Remedies: Claims and
Counterclaims, 42 Va. L. Rev. 301 (1956). Some courts have assumed such jurisdiction even
under present law. See, e.g., United States v. Finn, 127 F. Supp. 158 (S.D. Cal. 1954),
noted in 55 Colum. L. Rev. 930 (1955).
109. 31 U.S.C.A. § 529. The comparable Navy statute is 34 US.C.A. § 582, giving the
Government a lien upon the article contracted for in the event of partial payments. In
Thomson Machine Works Co. v. Lake Tahoe Marine Supply Co., 135 F. Supp. 913 (NJ).
Cal. 1955), the court upheld such a lien against a subcontractor's lien claim, in proceedings
in bankruptcy, stating that the intent of Congress was: "to give the fullest protection to
the government for progress payments made by it." Supra at 916.
110. 32 C.F.R. § 596.150-1, 16 Fed. Reg. 4042 (1951). The current regulation is some-
what more liberal than that in effect when the Lennox contract was placed. 32 C.F.R.
§ 596.150-1(b) (1954).
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sentations he may have made."' But more than this: by denying the
Government any relief, the trial and appellate courts frustrated the pur-
pose of the statute, and permitted an unlawful advance of public funds,
for which the Government received no return.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals,"-' affirming the District Court,
is a curious one. Two members of the court, Judges Medina and Hincks,
while agreeing with the trial court that the evidence did not show a breach
of contract by Lennox, were not prepared to hold that the Government
had violated a legal obligation in failing to make partial payments in the
full amount requested. But they did think that such failure was an
arbitrary exercise of discretion. This, coupled with the termination for
default, when no default existed, constituted inequitable conduct on the
part of the Government which deprived it of its right to enforce its
equitable lien on the contractor's property." 3 And, since Lennox had not
breached its contract, the Government was not entitled to damages.
Granted the finding of the trial court that Lennox was not in default,
there would be merit in this approach if the Government was seeking
either damages for breach or to enforce an equitable lien. Actually, it was
seeking neither." 4 It was asking for: 1. recoupment of partial payments
previously made and unliquidated by contract deliveries, and 2. recovery
of its property (not the contractor's), title to which had vested in the
Government under the express provisions of the contract.
Now something can be said for the proposition that the Government
should not be allowed both remedies. The writer personally believes that
the title which the Government obtains in a progress payment situation
should be regarded as merely a security title"O (although until the Len-
111. It is settled law that a Government agent may not exceed his actual authority,
and that the doctrines of apparent authority and estoppel may not be invoked against the
Government. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 US. 30 (1947). The strict
application of this principle has been criticized, and rightly so. See Berger, FstopplV
Against the Government, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6S0 (1954); Stelzenmuller, Formation of
Government Contracts-Application of Common Law Principles, 40 Cornell L.Q. 238)
243-55 (1955); Pasley, Formation of Government Contracts-Application of Common Lai,-
Principles-A Reply, 40 Cornell L.Q. 518, 531-33 (1955). But no one contends that a
Government agent should be allowed to exceed the clear bounds of his statutory authority,
or violate an express statutory mandate. See Stdzenmuller op. cit. supra at 2S4.
112. 225 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1955).
113. Id. at 317-18.
114. The Government's briefs on appeal made this very clear.
115. A conveyance, absolute in form, given to secure a debt ,ill often be construed as
an equitable mortgage. Walsh, Mortgages 34-42 (1934); Ozborne, Mortgagess §§ 76, 77
(1951). Confirmation of this view may be found in the following: (a) In a fixed-price
contract, the risk of loss remains on the contractor; that is, if the property is destroyed,
he still has to manufacture the goods required at his own expense; by contrast, the Govern-
ment ordinarily assumes the risk of loss on property which it really ors; (b) The con-
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nox case the courts have uniformly held that it is a true legal title)."'
The situation is really analogous to that of a mortgage. Absent fraud
or illegality, a mortgagor who seeks relief from his mortgage, or a debtor
who seeks to have a deed absolute declared a mortgage, must do equity
by paying the mortgage debt." 7 By refusing to give the Government
the benefit of its security, or to allow it to recoup the unliquidated balance
of its partial payment, the trial and appellate courts ignored this basic
principle.
Judges Medina and Hincks thought that the Government was seeking to
enforce a penalty. This might have been true if the Government was
allowed to recover both the property in full and the unliquidated balance
of the partial payment. But to deny the Government any recovery is
really to enforce a penalty against it, and to impose a forfeiture of tax-
payers' funds, to the extent of the unliquidated partial payment.
The really interesting part of the Court of Appeals opinion is the
special concurring opinion of Judge Frank. Judge Frank concurred in
the opinion of Judges Medina and Hincks as an alternative basis of
affirmance, but proceeded to set forth his own, somewhat different, views
at length.
Judge Frank agreed with the trial court that the Government had
breached its obligation under the Partial Payments clause, and had there-
fore wrongfully terminated the contract and could not ground its action
on the title provision of that clause." 8 He reached this conclusion by
tractor is not required to comply with the provisions of the "Manual for Control of Gov-
ernment Property in Possession of Contractors" (ASPR, Appendix B, § 104.2); (c) The
contract clause provides that upon liquidation of all progress payments or completion of
deliveries under the contract, title to all property not previously delivered to the Govern-
ment or incorporated in the supplies delivered under the contract shall revest in the con-
tractor. 32 C.F.R. § 596.150-1(c), subsection (d) (1954). On the effect of such a pro-
vision, see Walsh, Mortgages 40-41 (1934).
On the other hand, it can be argued that the governing statute prohibits partial pay-
ments unless the Government obtains legal title and at least constructive possession. 31
U.S.CA. § 529. See 20 Ops. Att'y Gen. 746 (1894). The Navy statute is satisfied, however,
by the creation of a lien. 34 U.S.C.A. § 582.
116. United States v. Ansonia Brass and Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452 (1910); United
States v. Davies (In re Read-York, Inc.), 152 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1945); Douglas Aircraft
Co. v. Byram, 57 Cal. App. 2d 311, 134 P.2d 15 (1943).
117. Kinney v. Smith, 58 Ore. 158, 113 Pac. 854 (1911); Walsh, Equity 283, n. 8
(1930); McClintock, Equity § 25, n.34 (2d ed. 1948); Buckingham v. Corning, 91 N.Y.
525 (1883).
118. 225 F.2d at 307, 316. Although judge Frank stated that the title provisions of the
partial payments clause did not entitle the Government to assert that title when the con-
tractor was not in default and the Government was, there is nothing in the clause to sup-
port him. Title, whether regarded as legal title or a security title, vests (and under the
governing statute, 31 U.S.C.A. § 529, must vest) in the Government immediately upon
the making of a partial payment. It is not affected in any way by a subsequent default,
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interpreting the word "may" as really meaning "shall." In other words,
the clause was intended to mean, "The Contracting Officer sll . .. make
partial payments to the Contractor .. .." and if the contract did not say
this, it should be reformed accordingly. This conclusion is supported by
the following arguments:
(i) Evidence before the trial court showed that it was the general
practice of the government to pay 757 of allowable substantial costs
whenever the contractor was a good risk;
(ii) It must, therefore, be taken as established that the Department
of the Army had administratively approved an interpretation of the
clause as leaving no discretion in the Contracting Officer when the con-
tractor was not in default or a bad risk;
(iii) In the light of the negotiations, the parties knew and intended
this meaning.
Now testimony of one or two Army officers concerning "common prac-
tice," and that it is "well known" that the Army will do thus and so, is
a weak reed on which to support a conclusion of a departmental inter-
pretation that "left no room for ... discretion." As a matter of actual
fact, this is not and never was the Army's interpretation of the clause.
After the Lennox opinion came down, the Judge Advocate General of
the Army gave an official opinion that the "court's understanding and in-
terpretation of the contract clauses entitled 'Progress Payments' (APP
7-150.1), 'Default' (ASPR 7-103.11), and 'Termination for Convenience
of the Government' (ASPR 8-701) are not in conformity with the gen-
erally accepted interpretations of those clauses by other courts, adminis-
trative agencies, and this office."119
In further support of his interpretation, Judge Frank used the reductio
ad absurdum argument. For, he said, if the word "may" is construed as
wholly permissive, then (a) Lennox paid $3,2000 for a clause which
would yield nothing unless the Contracting Officer, governed by mere
whim, chose to make a payment, and (b) upon payment of only $50, title
to thousands of dollars worth of property would vest in the Govern-
ment . 0
As is often the case with the reduwtio ad absurdum; argument, so here
it is based on extreme assumptions, divorced from realities. As a matter
of actual fact, the Contracting Officer did authorize partial payments, and
substantial payments were made: $293,214.23 (less $3,279.64) as
on either side, or by a termination. Both judge Frank and the trial judge seem to have
confused the title provisions of the partial payments clause with the title provicions of the
default clause and the termination for convenience clause.
119. JAGT 1955/10001, 7 Dec. 1955 (Dep't of the Army Cir. 715-S0-25, Procurement
Legal Service, 11 Jan. 1956, par. II, p. 1).
120. 225 F.2d at 309.
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against $327,964.04 originally requested. While nothing was paid against
the second request of $235,427, the Government's briefs pointed out that
this request was not supported by property "acquired or produced . . .
for the performance of the contract," as required by the statute, regula-
tion, and contract clause, but by engineering and development costs and
unfilled orders for new equipment. 2 ' The trial court's finding that Len-
nox request "included good incurred costs of more than $120,000"22 was
not sufficient. "Good incurred costs" are not the equivalent of "property
acquired or produced."
Moreover, the second part of the argument becomes irrelevant if the
writer's view is adopted that the Government's title under a partial pay-
ment clause should be regarded as essentially a security title.
The writer concedes that the word "may" should not be construed as
vesting complete and uncontrolled discretion in the Contracting Officer to
grant or withhold partial payments at his mere whim. Like any other
discretionary power, the authority to grant or withhold partial payments
should be exercised reasonably. But there was no real showing that the
ments. The unrecouped balance of such payments was $149,118.38. De-
Contracting Officer had arbitrarily or unreasonably withheld partial pay-
fendant stated in its brief that the property involved was worth
$200,000.123 $149,118.38 is almost exactly 75% of $200,000. It looks
very much as though the contracting officer had extended the maximum
amount of credit which the governing regulation permitted.1 24 If so,
there was no abuse of discretion.
Judge Frank vents his real scorn on those simple souls, like the writer,
who think that a Government contract means what it says, and should be
construed otherwise only where ambiguous on its face. Such a view,
he tells us, is a "vestigial remain of a notion prevailing in 'primitive
law.' ,125 Judge Frank proclaims (as most of us already suspected) that
"words are but clumsy 'vehicles' of expression, and the isolation of
words from their context is the mark of an inexperienced interpreter.1 20
With astonishing erudition, he ranges from Aristotle through the Roman
jurists to the modern philosophers, citing on the way Euclid, Duns Scotus,
Lucas De Penna, Schopenhauer, Spinoza, Goethe, Hegel, Bergson, Wig-
121. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 13-14; Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 6-8.
122. Finding No. 15 Appellant's Appendix, pp. 60a-60b; 131 F. Supp. at 728.
123. Appellees' Brief, p. 7.
124. Perhaps the unrecouped balance should be reduced by the $36,862.65 claim for
liquidated damages. Even so, the Government would have advanced more than 5017 of
the value of the property.
125. 225 F.2d at 310.
126. Id. at 311.
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more, Corbin, and Hyman Kaplan.127 In the words of Humpty-Dumpty:
"There's glory for you! "2s
It will be recalled that Humpty-Dumpty proceeded to give his own
definition of glory: "I meant 'there's a nice knock-down argument for
you!I" When Alice objected, "But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-
down argument,"' Humpty-Dumpty gave his famous answer, "When I
use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor
less."
The point is, though, that a Government Contracting Officer is not in
the position of Humpty-Dumpty. He lacks authority to make a word in
a standard contract form mean what he wants it to mean. He is bound
by statute, regulation, and the accepted interpretation of such forms. '
No amount of negotiation or "communication" between the parties can
change this simple fact. In considering only these, and ignoring the
statute and regulation, and accepting casual testimony of a few witnesses
as proof of an accepted Army interpretation, Judge Frank has done just
what he has warned us against, namely, isolating words from their over-
all context.
Before being carried away by Judge Frank's learning on the subject
of contract interpretation, the reader might well ponder the words of
another great judge, Cardozo, when faced with a similar problem:
"If this was the meaning, there is no expression of it in the r-iting.... The words
are not without an office and a value when their natural meaning is ascribed to
them."'130
Common sense, despised though it may be by many philosophers, tells
us that the natural meaning of "may" is not "shall," and that if the Army
had meant "shall" they would have said "shall."
If Judge Frank's views are recognized as law, the Government will be
faced with a serious situation. For every time a contract contains a
partial payments clause, the contractor, as long as he is not in default
and is not a bad risk, can demand that the Government finance him, as
he goes along, up to 75% of all his "good costs incurred," without regard
to the value of the security he may be able to give. And once started on
this course, the Government would not dare stop for fear of losing all
prior unrecouped payments and the security therefor. Polonius' predic-
tion would be fufilled that "loan oft loses both itself and friend." Fortu-
nately for the taxpayer, this is not Department of Defense policy.1 31 Nor,
127. Id. at 310-15.
12S. Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, c. VI.
129. See notes 111, 119 supra.
130. Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. Anderson Co., 239 N.Y. 289, 289, 146 N.E. 3si, 382
(1925).
131. See Dep't of Defense Contract Financing Policy, especially pars. 31.3(a) and (d);
32 C.F.R., Part 82, Appendix 1 (1954); 1A C.C.H. Gov't Contracts Rep. U 24,812. See
also 32 C.F.-. § 82.24 (1954).
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under the view of the majority of the Court of Appeals, is it the law that
the Government is obligated to make such partial payments."12
A fair disposition of the Lennox case, which would have done full
justice to the parties and no serious violence to the contract language, and
at the same time have given the contractor the benefit of all doubts, would
have been: (a) to allow the Government to realize on its security (i.e. the
property in question) to the extent of its unrecouped partial payments,
without any allowance for liquidated damages, Lennox to have the benefit
of any surplus; and (b) to treat the contract as terminated for conveni-
ence, giving Lennox reimbursement for all its costs on the terminated
portion of the contract, plus a fair profit on work done. By asking for
more than this, the Government succeeded in obtaining nothing, is still
defending a suit in the Court of Claims, and is faced in the future with
a strongly worded precedent against it.
IV. CONCLUSION
A Government contract is a complex document. Nevertheless it can
be understood, and its fair intendment ascertained, if it is read in the
light of: (a) the plain meaning of the language used; (b) the governing
statutes and regulations; and (c) so far as relevant, the actual proce-
dures followed in placing, administering, and settling such contracts. On
occasion, the plain meaning has been distorted, the statutes and regula-
tions overlooked, and the administrative procedures ignored or misunder-
stood. In these cases, the courts have often been led astray by counsel,
whether by Government counsel seeking to give an unwarranted exten-
sion to the finality aspects of the Wunderlich case,'33 or by counsel for
the contractors claiming that language used had a meaning never in-
tended. In all such situations the courts, and the bar generally, would
do well to heed the following words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter. He was
speaking of a federal statute, not related to procurement, but his thesis
is equally relevant here:
"The Holding Company Act of 1935 is a reticulated statute, not a hodgepodge. To
observe its explicit provisions is to respect the purpose of Congress and the care
with which it was formulated."' 34
The same may fairly be said of Government procurement statutes, reg-
ulations, and contract forms.
132. The authorities relied on by the defendant, and cited by the District Court, to the
effect that such an obligation exists, all involved contracts which provided that: "pay-
ments will be made ...as the work progresses," or language to that effect. Canal Co. v.
Gordon, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 561 (1867); Brooklyn & Queens Screen Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 97 Ct. Cl. 532 (1942) ; Overstreet v. United States, 55 Ct. Cl. 154 (1920) ; 9 Willis-
ton, Contracts § 206 (rev. ed. 1945).
133. See supra, pp. 224-25, and note 75 supra.
134. Securities and Exchange .Commission v. Drexel & Co., 348 U.S. 341, 350 (1955).
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